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Vagueness is a special case of indeterminacy—semantical indeterminacy. 
It may be indeterminate whether a sentence is true or false, indeterminate 
whether a term denotes a certain object, and indeterminate whether 
a given set is the extension of a certain predicate. I take the word ‘vague’—
my universe of discourse here comprises only linguistic items—to be 
entirely appropriate only in application to predicates and certain of their 
constituents.1 A predicate is vague if it is indeterminate, or, at any rate, 
possibly indeterminate, which set is its extension—or if it is possible that, 
for at least one object, it is indeterminate whether that object belongs to 
the extension of that predicate. In other words, a predicate is vague if it 
admits of (potential) borderline cases. In the case of one-place predicates, 
this comes down to saying that the term ‘vague’ applies primarily to verbs 
and adjectives and prepositions, the main constituents of predicates. (Of 
course, if it applies to verbs and adjectives, it applies to adverbs as well—
that is, to representatives of the grammatical categories “takes a verb and 
makes a verb” and “takes an adjective and makes an adjective.”)
1 I concede that we speak of statements as vague—but when we say that a statement 
is vague, we mean that it is insufficiently explicit about some matter, that it lacks relevant 
specifics that a statement on the topic in question might have been expected to include. 
For example, one might well complain that a statement made by a public official—“There 
appear to have been certain irregularities in the Minister’s conduct of his office,” let’s say—
was vague. But one would not be taken to mean that the statement was of indeterminate or 
indefinite truth-value: no doubt the speaker would be willing to grant that it was definitely 
true that there appeared to have been certain irregularities in the Minister’s conduct of 
his office. And, while “appearance of irregularity in the conduct of a ministerial office” 
certainly admits of borderline cases, this fact would not be the fact that the person who 
complained about the vagueness of the statement about the appearance of irregularity in 
the conduct of a ministerial office was calling attention to.
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I will restrict the application of the term ‘vague’ to items that belong 
to the grammatical categories I’ve roughly delineated—predicates, verbs, 
adjectives, prepositions, and adverbs. I deprecate, in particular, any attempt 
to describe sentences as “vague,” and I deprecate sentence operators like 
‘it is vague whether’ (or, worse, ‘it is vague that’). I am, however, happy to 
concede that my distaste for such usages is more a matter of my respect 
for the niceties of traditional English usage than a matter of logic or 
philosophy. I might mention in this connection—I need to mention 
it somewhere, and this seems as good a place as any—David Lewis’s 
statement that the truth-functional connectives and the “idioms of 
quantification” are not vague.2 As I see matters, this is a sort of category 
mistake. Since neither the connectives nor the quantifiers have semantical 
values of any sort, I don’t see what can be meant by saying either that 
they’re vague or that they’re not—or by saying that they do or that they 
don’t exhibit indeterminacy. Possibly all that Lewis meant by saying that 
the connectives were not vague is that if a truth-functionally compound 
sentence is of indeterminate truth-value, this can only be because one 
or more of its truth-functionally simple constituents is of indeterminate 
truth-value. And that would certainly not be a category mistake. And, 
possibly, by saying that the idioms of quantification were not vague, he 
meant only that if one examines a sentence that starts with, say, an exis-
tential quantifier-phrase whose scope is the remainder of the sentence, 
and if one is convinced that that sentence is of indeterminate truth-value, 
one will have to say that it’s of indeterminate truth-value because—and 
only because—it’s indeterminate whether anything satisfies the open 
sentence whose variable the quantifier-phrase binds. I’ll presently deny 
that thesis, but I certainly don’t want to say that it exhibits any sort of 
category mistake.
Perhaps I should also say this: in restricting my application of the 
terms ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘vagueness’ to linguistic items, I don’t mean 
to imply that these terms cannot be usefully applied to, say, attributes or 
relations or Fregean concepts and other non-linguistic abstract objects—
particularly those that belong to categories that (like the three categories 
I’ve mentioned) are intimately connected with predicates.
2 On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 212.
3indETErminacy and VaguEnEss: logic and mETaphysics
To return to the topic of the vocabulary I recommend for discussions 
of indeterminacy, I would contend that the best sentence operator to 
employ when making an assertion to the effect that something or other is 
indeterminate is ‘it is indeterminate whether’—or, at any rate, something 
very much like it. I suppose, however, that it is better for the primi-
tive operator in any area of semantics or logic to have a positive rather 
than a negative form, so let the primitive operator be ‘it is determinate 
whether’—despite the fact that ‘it is indeterminate whether’ seems a much 
more natural form of words than ‘it is determinate whether’. It is deter-
minate whether p just in the case that the proposition that p is definitely 
or determinately true or definitely or determinately false—or, if you like, 
if the question whether p can be answered Yes (without qualification) or 
No (without qualification).
Determinacy and indeterminacy obviously have a logic, and it is usual 
to use the methods of formal semantics to describe the features of a logic. 
Formal semantics is the discipline whose task is to assign semantical 
values to sentences on the basis of the semantical values assigned to their 
syntactical components.3 When the operator ‘it is determinate whether’ 
(‘DET’) is applied only to closed sentences, its semantics is simple, and, 
I hope, uncontroversial. It can be presented in a simple value-table:
p   ~p DETp      INDETp [= ~DETp]
0     1     1  0
½    ½     0   1
1     0     1  0
In this table, ‘1’ represents determinate truth or truth without qualifica-
tion, ‘0’ represents determinate falsity or falsity without qualification, 
and ‘½’ represents the condition “being neither determinately true nor 
determinately false.”
3 More exactly, that task is the “core” or central task of formal semantics. Once one 
has decided how to assign semantical values to sentences on the basis of the semantical 
values of their components, one may go on to assign semantical values to sequences 
of sentences (to arguments or inferences) on the basis of the semantical values of the 
syntactical components of the members of the sequences—values like ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’, 
for example.
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It is certainly true—determinately true—that we make assertions that 
are neither determinately true nor determinately false. No one would deny 
that in many cases, no doubt in most cases, the fact that an assertion is of 
indeterminate truth-value has its ground in language. But is this always 
the case? I will try to answer this question. The first step of my attempt 
to answer it will be an outline of what I what I will call the “sensible” 
theory of indeterminacy.
The sensible theory of indeterminacy (sc. of truth-value) is that in-
determinacy of truth-value is entirely a matter of the semantical values 
of the syntactic constituents of sentences being underdetermined by the 
conventions that govern the assignment of those values. Consider, for 
example, predicates. (From this point to the point at which I explicitly 
resume speaking in propria persona, I will speak in the voice of an adherent 
of the sensible theory.) To specify the meaning of a predicate is to give 
a set of instructions for its application, and it is well-nigh impossible for 
a set of instructions to cover every possible situation; in consequence, no 
matter how carefully we specify the rules for using some new predicate 
that we propose to introduce into our language, there will almost certainly 
be possible cases in which it is indeterminate whether that predicate 
applies. (And, as many writers have pointed out, when one introduces 
a new predicate, there will normally be good, practical reasons for leaving 
it indeterminate whether it applies in possible cases in which one could 
render its application determinate. As Lewis has said, no one has ever 
been fool enough to try to specify a precise portion of the surface of the 
earth as the referent of ‘the outback’.4) It would seem, therefore, that all 
or almost all predicates will admit of possible borderline cases; and many 
predicates will have actual borderline cases. It is these actual borderline 
cases that account for all actual cases of indeterminacy—that is, all cases 
of assertions that are syntactically and semantically unobjectionable and 
are yet neither determinately true nor determinately false. (Someone’s 
statement that Fred is bald, say, or that Mary is tall.)
I have said that “all or almost all” predicates will admit of possible 
borderline cases. Might all predicates have possible borderline cases? 
Pure mathematics provides a class of possible counterexamples to the 
4 Loc. cit.
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thesis that all predicates have possible borderline cases, as do theology 
and Platonic metaphysics and theoretical physics (‘electron’, ‘neutrino’). 
I will not discuss cases of that sort. Those cases aside, there are certain 
special predicates that have and can have no borderline cases. These are 
the predicates that can be constructed using only the language of first-
order logic—that is, first-order logic with identity, for it is only when the 
identity-sign has been added to the language of logic that it is possible 
to construct predicates entirely out of logical materials. Two important 
examples are ‘x = x’ and ‘x = y’. (I’m not going to bother to distinguish 
between predicates and the open sentences that are their typical instances.) 
The former expresses the attribute of existence (being equivalent to 
‘$y y = x’, at least given the usual formulation of the rule of existential 
generalization), and the latter the relation of identity. These predicates 
have no borderline cases, for existence and identity have no borderline 
cases. “Identity, properly speaking, knows no gradation,” says Quine,5 
and Chisholm has said more or less the same thing about existence.6 It 
is predicates whose meaning is specified by a set of instructions (instruc-
tions that determine—insofar as anything determines this—whether that 
predicate applies to a given object or sequence of objects) that are vague, 
that have possible or actual, borderline cases. There can be no borderline 
cases of existence, because an object has to be there to be a borderline 
case of anything, and if it’s there it exists. There can be no borderline 
cases of identity because an object x and an object y are either two objects 
or one; if they are two, they are not identical, and if they are one they 
are. If there were borderline cases of existence, there would be sets each 
of which was such that it was indeterminate whether it was the empty 
set or a unit set. If there were borderline cases of identity, there would 
be sets each of which was such that it was indeterminate whether it 
had one or two members. And these things are simply impossible. All 
indeterminacy is a product of vagueness (the vagueness that comes from 
vaguely drawn boundaries), and vagueness takes up only where logic has 
left off—and, therefore, indeterminacy takes up only where logic has left 
5 Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), p. 203.
6 See his essay, “Coming into Being and Passing Away” in On Metaphysics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), especially the section entitled “Elanguescence,” pp. 
55-56.
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off. Vagueness arises when we draw boundaries and arises because it is 
humanly impossible to draw any boundary such that every possible object 
falls either definitely inside or definitely outside that boundary. But in 
logic there is no drawing of boundaries.
Here endeth the statement of the sensible theory of indeterminacy. 
I resume speaking in propria persona.
In my view, the sensible theory of indeterminacy, appealing as it is, 
cannot accommodate a workable metaphysic of the material world. Any 
attempt to spell out in detail a metaphysic of the material world that 
incorporates the sensible theory of indeterminacy (which denies that there 
can be indeterminate cases of identity and existence) will demonstrably 
have consequences less appealing, or more appalling, than a rejection of 
the sensible theory of indeterminacy. There is a lot that could be said 
about this. I could write a book. Here I must content myself with an 
example. When we attempt to construct a metaphysic of the material 
world, one of the questions we must answer is the Special Composition 
Question: “When are things proper parts—when do things together 
compose some larger whole?” Suppose, just for the sake of having an 
illustration, that we say that things compose a larger whole when and 
only when they are in physical contact. (Thus, twenty blocks spread about 
on a floor compose nothing; when a child builds a tower out of them, 
they compose something: a tower of blocks.) Now suppose the world 
consists of two cubical blocks—each of exactly the same dimensions as 
the other—floating about in otherwise empty space; and suppose that 
at one time they are not in contact and that a moment later they drift 
together and are in contact. If current physics is correct, there must have 
been some moment t at which it was indeterminate whether they were 
in contact. (By “current physics,” I do not mean quantum mechanics, 
or at least I am not thinking primarily of quantum mechanics—I am 
referring to facts about the structure of matter that were known well 
before the advent of quantum mechanics.) Now consider the moment 
t—a moment at which it is indeterminate whether the two blocks are 
in contact. Ask this question: Does anything larger than either of the 
two blocks exist at t? It cannot be definitely true that there then exists 
something larger than either block, for that could be the case only if 
there were definitely something the two blocks were parts of; and there 
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could definitely be something the two blocks were parts of only if the 
two blocks were definitely in contact. A parallel argument shows that it 
cannot be definitely false that there then exists something larger than 
either block. So we have a case of indeterminacy—from the point of 
view of our simple possible world, an actual case. According to the 
sensible theory of indeterminacy, this must be because there is, in our 
miniature world, something that is a borderline case of “is larger than 
either block.” But what is it? It is not either of the blocks, each of which 
is a determinate case of “is not larger than either block.” And if the two 
blocks have proper parts, it certainly isn’t any of them. Could it be the 
fusion or mereological sum of the blocks, the thing they compose, the 
thing that has them both as parts and each of whose parts overlaps 
at least one of them? This suggestion will not do because it is not at 
t determinately true that there is such a thing, and we are thus not in 
a position to assert, “The sum of the blocks is at t a borderline case of ‘is 
larger than either block’.” (And, of course, even if we were in a position 
to make assertions implying the existence at t of the sum of the blocks, 
this would not enable us to explain the case of indeterminacy we want 
to explain, for the sum of the blocks would not be a borderline case of 
‘is larger than either block’; it would be quite definitely twice the size 
of either of the blocks.) Our little possible world seems to contain no 
other candidate for the office “is a borderline-case of ‘is larger than either 
block’.” It seems, indeed, to contain no even remotely plausible candidate 
for that office. It would appear, therefore, (a) that the assertion “There 
exists something larger than either block” is of indeterminate truth-value, 
and (b) that we cannot explain this indeterminacy by saying “There is 
something that is a borderline case of ‘is larger than either block’.”
It is instructive to compare this example with a case of indeterminacy 
in which the sensible theory seems to provide a correct explanation of 
that indeterminacy. Suppose that Socrates is “borderline wise,” and that 
no one is determinately wise. Then it is indeterminate whether there is 
anyone who is wise, and the explanation is a straightforward one: there 
exists someone—Socrates—such that it is indeterminate whether the 
predicate ‘is wise’ applies to that person, and there exists no one such 
that the predicate ‘is wise’ determinately applies to that person. But in 
the “two blocks” case, I cannot make the assertion that corresponds to 
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“There exists someone such that it is indeterminate whether the predicate 
‘is wise’ applies to that person”: I cannot say, “There exists something such 
that it is indeterminate whether the predicate ‘is larger than either block’ 
applies to that thing.”
If the sensible theory is correct, however, the only way to explain the 
indeterminacy of truth-value of ‘There exists something larger than either 
block’ is to assert the existence of an object such that it is indeterminate 
whether ‘is larger than either block’ applies to it. If our simple possible 
world is indeed possible, therefore, the sensible theory is wrong. In our 
simple possible world, existence is indeterminate: it is indeterminate 
whether there exists a mereological sum of the two blocks, and not because 
there exists something that is a borderline case of ‘is a mereological sum 
of the two blocks’. And the idea of indeterminate existence is a mystery; 
we understand indeterminacy, at least to some degree, when it can be 
explained by reference to vaguely drawn boundaries; but cases of inde-
terminate existence cannot be explained by reference to vaguely drawn 
boundaries.
So: there are sentences in which one variable is free that have both 
the following properties:
The existential generalization on those sentences is of indeterminate •	
truth-value.
Their existential generalizations’ being of indeterminate truth-value •	
cannot be explained by an appeal to objects that “borderline satisfy” 
them.
It is in that sense that existence is indeterminate—there are such open 
sentences. (Or there are at least sentences that, in certain possible circum-
stances, would have those properties.) When I contend that existence can 
be indeterminate, I mean only that much. I do not mean that there are or 
could be objects that are or would be borderline cases of existence. There 
cannot be an object that borderline-satisfies ‘$y y = x’. (At any rate, there 
cannot definitely or determinately be an object that borderline-satisfies 
this sentence—and, therefore, anyone who agrees with very much of 
what I have said will not be in a position to use the sentence ‘There is 
an object that borderline-satisfies “$y y = x”’ to make an assertion. One 
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might argue about whether this metalinguistic or semantical sentence 
might, if circumstances cooperated, be of indeterminate truth-value, but 
there are certainly no circumstances in which it would be determinately 
true.7) There are, therefore, sentences whose philosophical import can 
be summed up in the slogan “Existence can be indeterminate.” There 
is, however, no reason to say that existence can be vague (or to use 
phrases like ‘the vagueness of existence’ or ‘vague existence’)—for the 
slogan “existence can be vague” strongly suggests that the sloganeer 
thinks that there are possible circumstances in which there would be 
borderline existents.
Since the case of indeterminacy—existential indeterminacy—we have 
considered cannot be grounded in language, it seems fair to describe it as 
a case of ontic indeterminacy.
I contend this: any carefully worked-out metaphysic of the material 
world will either present us with cases of existential indeterminacy or else 
will have consequences that embody even more unpalatable mysteries 
than the mysteries that attend existential indeterminacy. (For example, 
it may imply that there are no such things as you or I, or that for every 
material thing x, it is a necessary truth that for every moment t, it is either 
determinately true or determinately false that x exists at t.) Rather than 
accept any of these consequences and confront the mysteries that follow 
in their wake, I prefer to accept the reality of existential indeterminacy. 
If existential indeterminacy is a phenomenon that is not well understood 
(to borrow a euphemism from the sciences), it is certainly not the only 
one. After all, no one really understands such staples of philosophical 
discourse as self-reference, consciousness, time, and free will. If we do 
not understand something, the thing to do is to own up to that fact, and 
not to insist that that “something” does not exist.
If there are sentences whose philosophical import can be epitomized 
in the slogan, “Existence can be indeterminate,” there are also sentences 
whose philosophical import can be epitomized in the following two 
slogans: “Identity can be indeterminate”; “Identity can be vague.”
7 Return to the case of the two blocks. Consider the moment t at which the two blocks 
are in “borderline contact.” It is plausible to suppose that the sentence ‘There is an object 
that borderline-satisfies “$y y = x”’ is of indeterminate truth-value at t. However that may 
be, there is certainly never a time at which that semantical assertion is determinately true.
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An example of Terence Parsons’s shows that there are such sentences:
Suppose I am driving down the freeway, and suddenly swerve to avoid 
a pile of trash. The cleanup crews show up later, and push around a lot of 
stuff—some of which made up the pile I swerved around, as well as some 
other stuff. The next day I drive by a pile of trash. Is it the same pile as the 
pile that was there yesterday? In some cases of this sort, the question has 
no apparent answer.8
We can recast Parsons’s metaphysical question as a semantical question. 
Suppose that, having passed the pile of trash on “the next day,” Parsons 
utters the following sentence: “The pile of trash I swerved to avoid yes-
terday = the pile of trash I drove by today.”
Is this sentence (“the Parsons sentence”) true or false? Like the meta-
physical question, this semantical question may well have no apparent 
answer. Let us suppose that it does not. If it does not, that is because it 
has no determinate answer. (The question, ‘Is the number of ‘7’s in the first 
trillion digits of the decimal expansion of p odd or even?’ has no apparent 
answer—no answer that is apparent to any reader of this paper, at any 
rate—, but it has a determinate answer.) There are, therefore, identity 
sentences of indeterminate truth-value.9
Can the indeterminacy of sentences like the Parsons sentence be 
accounted for by the sensible theory of indeterminacy? Well, it can if 
one is willing to adopt a perdurantist account of identity across time. 
But that account involves its adherents in various mysteries (for example, 
that each of us has a certain precise span of existence—like 81 years, 14 
8 “Entities without Identity,” Philosophical Perspectives 1: Metaphysics (1987), pp. 1-19. 
See p. 3.
9 Since I myself don’t—in the ontology room—believe in piles of trash, since I believe 
that, speaking strictly and ontologically, every pile of trash is definitely non-identical with 
every pile of trash, in my own discussion of indeterminate identity I imagined an example 
involving an indeterminate number of human beings and an infernal device called the 
Cabinet. But the logical point Parsons’s example was intended to make and the logical 
point my example was intended to make are the same. My discussion of the possibility of 
indeterminate identity can be found in Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990), Section 18, pp. 228-270.
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days, 11 hours, 53 minutes, and eight and one half seconds—essentially10). 
I will not discuss that option. I will simply suppose that, for one reason 
or another, one is not willing to adopt perdurantism; in that case, might 
one account for the indeterminacy of the Parsons sentence in terms 
acceptable to proponents of the sensible theory of indeterminacy? It 
might seem so. For, if one is persuaded by Parsons’s case, one will come 
to the conclusion that the indeterminacy of the sentence can be traced 
to the vagueness of a predicate that occurs in that sentence, to wit, the 
identity predicate. After all, if one is persuaded to see things as Parsons 
sees them, one will be persuaded that identity has borderline cases: the 
objects the pile of trash I swerved to avoid on Tuesday and the pile of trash 
I swerved to avoid on Friday constitute a borderline case of two objects 
and therefore, taken together, taken as a pair11, constitute a borderline 
case of identity. But, as we have seen, it is an essential component of 
the sensible theory of indeterminacy that the predicate ‘x = y’ cannot 
admit of borderline cases.
If the Parsons sentence is indeed of indeterminate truth-value (we 
are assuming, remember, that its right-hand term and its left-hand term 
both definitely denote something), it presents us with a case of ontic 
indeterminacy, indeterminacy whose ground is in the world and not in 
language. Existential indeterminacy and indeterminacy of identity are 
two kinds of ontic indeterminacy (the only two of which I am aware).
If the Parsons “piles of trash” case is a case of ontic indeterminacy, it 
is also a case of ontic vagueness—for if the Parsons sentence is of inde-
terminate truth-value (and if its right-hand term and its left-hand term 
10 See my essay “Four-dimensional Objects,” Noûs 24 (1990), pp. 245-255. The 
consequence mentioned in the text can be avoided if one adopts an anti-realist account 
of modality de re (such as counterpart theory with multiple counterpart relations). But 
the idea that there is no fact of the matter as to what a thing’s essential properties are is 
a very mysterious idea—much more mysterious than the idea of indeterminate identity. 
Or so say I.
11 “Taken as a pair” is, I concede, loose talk. A pair, I suppose, is a two-membered set. 
But either there is no such set as {the pile of trash Parsons swerved to avoid yesterday, the 
pile of trash Parsons drove by today}, or, if there is such a set, it is indeterminate whether 
it has one member or two. In either case, it is far from evident what it could mean to 
speak of taking the pile of trash Parsons swerved to avoid yesterday and the pile of trash 
Parsons drove by today “as a pair.”
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both definitely denote something), then the identity predicate is vague. 
Although the existence predicate (‘x = x’ or ‘$y y = x’) does not admit of 
borderline cases, the identity predicate (‘x = y’) does.
It is true, of course, that the sensible theory of indeterminacy can 
account for some indeterminate identity-sentences—just as it can ac-
count for some indeterminate existential sentences. (Some early critics of 
Gareth Evans’s famous argument for the impossibility of vague identity 
apparently thought that he was trying to prove the obviously false thesis 
that there could not be any identity-sentences of indeterminate truth-
value.12) Suppose, for example that in 1792 it was indeterminate whether 
Louis XVI (or “Citizen Capêt”) reigned over France, and determinately 
true that no other person did. If, then, someone had said in 1792, “The 
present King of France = the King of France in 1782,” what that person 
said would have been of indeterminate truth-value. And, of course, the 
sensible theorists have no trouble accounting for that: there is a certain 
object such that, in 1792, at the moment the sentence was uttered, it 
was determinately true that ‘the King of France in 1782’ denoted that 
object and indeterminate whether ‘the present King of France’ denoted 
that object. But there is an important semantical difference between the 
“King of France” sentence and the Parsons sentence. It’s indeterminate 
whether the phrase ‘the present King of France’ (uttered in 1792) denotes 
the King of France in 1782 (that is, denotes the man who held that royal 
office in 1782) because it’s indeterminate whether it denotes anyone. (More 
exactly, because it has the following feature: There is some x—at least 
one—such that it’s indeterminate whether it denotes x, and there’s no x 
such that it determinately denotes x.) It’s indeterminate whether ‘the pile 
of trash I passed by today’ (uttered by Parsons on a certain day) denotes 
the pile of trash Parsons had swerved to avoid on the previous day. But 
this fact cannot be explained by saying that it’s indeterminate whether 
‘the pile of trash I passed by today’ denotes anything at all. For it quite 
definitely does denote something—the unique pile of trash that Parsons 
passed on the day he used that denoting phrase. The identity-sentences 
whose indeterminacy the sensible theory cannot account for are those 
12 See David Lewis, “Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood,” Analysis 48 (1988), pp. 
128-130.
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each of whose terms definitely denotes something—sentences like the 
Parsons sentence or the sentence that figured in my “Cabinet” example. 
(In the latter case, one of the terms of the sentence definitely denotes 
the person who entered the Cabinet and the other definitely denotes 
the person who emerged from the Cabinet.)
I alluded a moment ago to Gareth Evans’s clever argument for 
the impossibility of vague identity.13 You know: if Trashers is a pile of 
trash and Rubbers is a pile of trash, it can’t be indeterminate whether 
Trashers and Rubbers are identical. For suppose it is indeterminate. 
Then Trashers has the property of being (only) indeterminately identi-
cal with Rubbers. But Rubbers obviously does not have the property 
of being (only) indeterminately identical with Rubbers.14 It therefore 
follows from the premise that Trashers and Rubbers are indeterminately 
identical that Trashers has a property Rubbers lacks and is therefore 
not identical with Rubbers. Now the proponents of indeterminate 
identity will want to assert the sentence ‘It is indeterminate whether 
Trashers is identical with Rubbers’. And one should be willing to assert 
anything one recognizes as validly deducible from something that one 
is willing to assert. The friends of indeterminate identity, therefore, 
should be willing to assert that Trashers is not identical with Rubbers. 
But one should be willing to assert something only if one regards it 
as determinately true. The friends of indeterminate identity should, 
therefore, regard ‘Trashers is not identical with Rubbers’ as determinately 
true and ‘Trashers is identical with Rubbers’ as determinately false—and 
should, in consequence, regard ‘It is indeterminate whether Trashers 
is identical with Rubbers’ as determinately false. Therefore, anyone 
who accepts the thesis that Trashers is indeterminately identical with 
Rubbers is committed—if only pragmatically—to accepting the denial 
of that thesis. If the friends of indeterminate identity are indeed in this 
position, it is unlikely that they will regard themselves as in a state of 
philosophical equilibrium.
13 “Can There be Vague Objects?” Analysis 38 (1978), p. 208.
14 Or, if you don’t like the idea of properties that involve individuals, suppose that 
Rubbers contains an empty Blue Bull Bitter bottle and that Trashers does not. Then 
Trashers has the property of being (only) indeterminately identical with something that 
contains an empty Blue Bull Bitter bottle and Rubbers does not have that property.
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The question this argument has always brought to my mind is: Which 
of the following two theses is the more plausible—that cases like Parsons’s 
“piles of trash” case fail to establish the real possibility of indeterminate 
identity or that there is an invalid step (at least one) in Evans’s deduc-
tion of ‘Trashers is not identical with Rubbers’ from ‘It is indeterminate 
whether Trashers is identical with Rubbers’? And it has always seemed 
to me that the answer is obvious—at any rate the prima facie answer. 
The prima facie answer, the default answer, the answer one should ac-
cept unless there should turn out to be something seriously wrong with 
it—demonstrably seriously wrong with it—is that the thesis that there’s 
something wrong with Evans’s argument is the more plausible of the two. 
Evans’s argument, in my view, is in much the same position as Zeno’s 
arguments: in each case, we may ask, “For what is a man profited if he shall 
present an a priori demonstration of the non-existence of x and there’s an 
x right before the eyes of his audience?” (No doubt there will be some rude 
people who will tell me that I’m the last person who should be appealing 
to that principle.) I don’t see that it’s up to me to identify the flaw in an 
argument whose conclusion obviously does not follow from its premises, 
but it will certainly strengthen my case if I can point to some feature or 
features of the argument that are viable candidates for the office “flaw(s) in 
the argument.” (If I couldn’t do that much, if no one could, if no one, after 
much effort by very able people, was able to make any halfway plausible 
suggestion as to what one of the alleged flaws might be—that would be 
a good reason to re-open the question whether Parsons had presented 
a convincing example of the indeterminacy of identity.) After all, as I’ve 
always insisted, if the idea of “the burden of proof ” (the burden of being 
the only one in the local community of discourse who is required to prove 
things) makes any sense outside the law15, here’s the sense it makes: The 
burden of proof is borne by whoever it is that is trying to prove something. 
And Evans was the one who was trying to prove something, to wit, that 
indeterminate identity was impossible. The critics of Evans’s reasoning 
were not trying to prove that indeterminate identity was possible or to 
15 In a criminal trial, for reasons that have nothing to do with dialectics and have 
everything to do with the necessity of constraining the power of the state, the burden of 
proof falls upon the state (or the Crown or the prosecution) and not upon the accused or 
the defense—the “burden,” that is, of having to prove its assertions.
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prove anything else—or nothing beyond, “Evans’s argument does not 
demonstrate the impossibility of indeterminate identity.” The critics of 
Evans’s reasoning were not even trying to prove that that reasoning was 
invalid—but only that one didn’t have to regard it as valid.
My own candidate for “flaw in the argument” was the following 
(adapted to the informal presentation of the argument I presented a mo-
ment ago).16 The reasoning included this assertion: “Rubbers obviously 
does not have the property of being indeterminately identical with 
Rubbers.”17 Is it “obvious” that Rubbers lacks the property of being 
indefinitely identical with Rubbers? Let’s back away from this question 
for a moment, and ask a more general question: How should the friends 
of the possibility of indeterminate identity answer this question: Suppose 
that x has the property F and that y is indeterminately identical with x; 
can it be determinately true that y lacks F? I say, as one who takes the 
idea of indeterminate identity seriously, that it seems entirely plausible to 
say that the answer to this question is No. I can’t prove that the answer 
is No, but, then, in the present dialectical situation, it’s not incumbent 
on me to prove that thesis or any other thesis; it’s rather up to Evans, 
or to the proponents of Evans’s argument, to prove that the answer is 
Yes. And he—or they—will want to prove that. For suppose the answer 
is No. Let F be the property of being indeterminately identical with 
Rubbers. We have supposed for the sake of argument that Trashers has 
that property. But then, if the answer to our question is No, Rubbers 
cannot determinately lack the property of being indeterminately identical 
with Rubbers—since it is indeterminately identical with something that 
has that property. And, therefore, the proponent of Evans’s argument 
is not in a position to affirm the “obvious” premise of the argument 
that I mentioned a moment ago: that Rubbers lacks the property of 
being indefinitely identical with Rubbers. Obviously that premise is not 
16 Material Beings, loc. cit.
17 In my informal presentation of Evans’s reasoning, this statement isn’t deduced from 
anything. It’s just put forward as pretty obviously true. If I were being more faithful to 
Evans’s text, I’d have got to this statement by deducing it from the perhaps even more 
evident statement ‘It is not indeterminate whether Rubbers is identical with Rubbers’. 
In the discussion that follows in the text, I’ll continue to represent Evans’s argument in 
this way.
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determinately false—but it is not determinately true, either, and thus 
cannot properly be asserted.
In my discussion of Evans’s argument in Material Beings, I used the 
intuitive idea illustrated in this informal reply to Evans to construct 
a formal semantics for a simple little language (a very simple language 
indeed, but Evans’s argument could be formulated in it). The philosophical 
lessons of the semantics were perhaps not negligible, but they were not 
as important as the intuitive idea behind it: if x has the property F, and 
if y is indeterminately identical with x, then it cannot be determinately 
true that y lacks F. 18
I’ll close by remarking that this formal semantics has attracted some 
very strange—so it seems to me at any rate—commentary. Here is a typical 
example (from an article by Nicholas Smith) of the kind of commentary 
I have in mind.
Van Inwagen seems to be presenting a standard sort of set-theoretic model, 
and indeed makes free use of the relation of identity with which any ordinary 
set comes pre-equipped (both in specifying that pairs be genuinely two-
membered, and when he says “If x and y, x ¹ y, are members of a pair .. .”)—but 
this is then in tension with the later claim that “The objects with which an 
object is paired are to be thought of as the objects such that it is indefinite 
whether that object is identical with them.” We have been explicitly told 
that in a pairing {x, y}, x and y must be non-identical. Now we are told that 
x and y are to be thought of as indefinitely identical. I cannot make sense of 
this. If we are working with a standard set-theoretic model, then x and y are 
simply non-identical; if we are not, then unless we are given some other way 
to understand the presentation, we do not understand it at all. The ordinary 
18 I will mention two features of the semantics that were not exhibited in my statement 
of the “basic idea” because I think they’re of some interest. First, although the semantics 
refuses to confer definite truth on ‘It is not the case that it is indeterminate whether 
Rubbers has the property of being identical with Rubbers’, it insists on conferring definite 
truth on ‘It is not the case that it is indeterminate whether Rubbers is identical with 
Rubbers’. (See the previous note.) And, secondly, it insists on conferring definite truth 
on ‘It is not the case that it is indeterminate whether Rubbers has the property of being 
identical with itself ’. (The property of being a thing that is identical with Rubbers is 
not the same property as the property of being a thing that is identical with itself. For 
one thing their extensions are rather different. Graduate students are always telling me 
that these two properties somehow become identical “when Rubbers has them.” If you 
understand that, I hope you’ll explain it to me, because I don’t.)
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understanding of set-theoretic models rules out van Inwagen’s proposed 
interpretation of his construction—yet no other way of understanding the 
construction is presented.19
I will remark that this criticism ignores long passages in the work Smith 
is discussing that, I would guess, are devoted to the very points he raises—
although I can’t be sure because I’m not sure what those points are. But 
let that pass—for it has more to do with the boring (to you anyway) and 
entirely non-philosophical question whether Smith was fair to me than it 
has to do with any philosophical problems about indeterminate identity.
Let us turn to the philosophical points. What is the charge that Smith 
is bringing against me? I don’t know because I don’t know what is intended 
by the phrase ‘van Inwagen’s proposed interpretation of his construction’. 
The “construction” was supposed to divide the inferences expressible in 
a certain simple formal language into two classes, classes I labeled “valid” 
and “invalid” (it of course consigns some of the inferences comprised in 
Evans’s argument to the class I called “invalid”). It certainly does that, and 
insofar as that is its purpose, it doesn’t need an interpretation. What else 
did I do or say that the charge might be directed against? Well, having laid 
out the semantics, I presented some philosophical arguments intended to 
show that the friends of indeterminate identity should find the division 
the semantics produces at least plausible—I mean that they should find 
it plausible to suppose that the arguments the semantics classifies as valid 
and invalid have just those properties. (The arguments were of the same 
sort as the “Trashers”-“Rubbers” argument above.) But Smith does not 
mention these arguments.
In the end, I think I have to say that Smith’s criticism of the semantics 
is no more than a reaction to certain heuristic idioms I used—the most 
important of which is the phrase ‘are to be thought of ’. (The core of his 
argument seems to be these three sentences: “We have been explicitly told 
that in a pairing {x, y}, x and y must be non-identical. Now we are told 
that x and y are to be thought of as indefinitely identical. I cannot make 
sense of this.”) If I am right about this, Smith’s criticism is an artifact 
of his taking this phrase more seriously than I intended it to be taken, 
19 Nicholas J.J. Smith, “Why Sense Cannot be Made of Vague Identity,” Noûs 42:1 
(2008), pp. 1–16. The quoted text is on p. 7.
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of his placing more dialectical weight on it than it was designed to bear. 
And why did I use this phrase, this phrase that was not designed to bear 
much dialectical weight? Well, it’s quite common for philosophers who 
are trying to convey the intuitive motivation for a formal semantics to 
use the phrase ‘are to be thought of ’—knowingly to use it—in ways that, 
on analysis, can be seen to make no sense.
The most obvious example is provided by its use by writers on the 
semantics of quantified modal logic when they are trying to give their 
readers an intuitive grasp of what is “going on” in the model theory. 
Consider the following sentence: “The members of the universal domain 
that are not assigned to the actual world by a model are to be thought 
of as the things that, according to that model, do not actually exist but 
exist in other possible worlds”—a sentence I have made up but which is 
typical of things that are said in textbooks of modal logic.20 In my view, 
the idea of things that do not actually exist (whether they exist in other 
possible worlds or not) is nonsense. And, therefore, the sentence I have 
imagined is nonsense, for an invitation to “think of ” certain of the objects 
contained in a model “as” so-and-sos is nonsense if the definition that 
has been provided for ‘so-and-sos’ is nonsense. But if sentences like my 
imaginary sentence are nonsense, they’re very useful nonsense: like it or 
not, it’s an empirical fact that nonsense of that kind helps students of the 
semantics of quantified modal logic to keep their bearings while they are 
picking their way through the complexities of the model theory.
I think that the critics of my semantics who have said something 
along the lines I’ve been discussing—Smith is not the only one—must 
think that the purpose of the semantics is somehow to explain the idea 
of indeterminate identity or to make it intelligible to an audience of its 
20 Here’s a real and rather famous example of this sort of talk, although it does not 
contain the words ‘are to be thought of ’. In “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic” 
[printed in Leonard Linsky (ed.) Reference and Modality (Oxford and London: Oxford 
University Press: 1971), pp. 63-72], Saul Kripke wrote (p. 65): “Intuitively, y(H) [the domain 
of the world H] is the set of all individuals existing in H. Notice that y(H) need not be 
the same set for different arguments H, just as, intuitively, in worlds other than the real 
one, some actually existing individuals may be absent, while new individuals, like Pegasus, 
may appear.” I think it is obvious that Kripke might just as well have written ‘y(H) is to 
be thought of as the set of individuals existing in H’ as ‘Intuitively, y(H) is the set of all 
individuals existing in H’.
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cultured despisers or to show that it’s a coherent idea. And they suppose 
that a certain bit of heuristic whistle-talk (‘The objects with which an 
object is paired are to be thought of as the objects such that it is indefinite 
whether that object is identical with them’)—a mere aside, a throwaway 
line—was an essential part of that project.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Explaining what indeter-
minate identity is is not what the formal semantics is for. And it’s not 
for making the idea of indeterminate identity intelligible, either, or for 
demonstrating that that idea is coherent.21 Those things are what the piles 
of trash and the Cabinet are for: Consider those cases (we, the friends of 
indeterminate identity, whisper seductively to the cultured despisers), and 
you’ll gain some degree of understanding of the idea of indeterminate 
identity—and you’ll see that it’s a coherent idea, since you’ll see that there 
are possible cases of it. The semantics is simply a device for dividing the 
arguments expressible in a certain formal language into two exhaustive 
and exclusive classes. The task of convincing students of the semantics that 
one of those classes is “the valid ones” and that the other is “the invalid 
ones” falls to the informal philosophical commentary on the semantics. 
And, if that task has been accomplished, we friends of indeterminate 
identity can point out to the cultured despisers that Evans’s argument is 
to be found among the invalid ones.22
21 At one place (p. 6), Smith quotes a passage in which I define certain terms used 
in the model theory and describes it as “van Inwagen’s attempt to make sense of vague 
identity.” At many places he refers to attempts (mine supposedly among them) to “model 
vague identity” or to “model vague identity within set theory.” These two phrases call 
for comment, since it’s not clear what they mean. It’s true that I gave a model-theoretic 
definition (a definition couched in terms of ordinary set theory) of the predicate ‘valid’ 
as applied to the arguments expressible in a language that includes an “indeterminacy” 
operator and the identity sign. Does that mean that I attempted to “model vague identity”? 
Owing to the vagueness of that phrase, the question has no answer. But if my definition 
of validity was an attempt to “model vague identity,” my attempt to model vague identity 
was not an attempt to explain or make sense of vague identity.
22 This paper was presented and discussed at a workshop called “Metaphysical 
Indeterminacy: the state of the art” at the University of Leeds in May of 2009 and 
was composed for that occasion. I thank the other speakers at and participants in the 
conference for many helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Elizabeth Barnes, 
Ross Cameron, Katherine Hawley, Daniel Nolan, and Robert Williams.
